Letter to DOJ re West merger

From: johnl@ibm.net
Date: Tue Sep 03 1996 - 11:36:42 PDT


For what it is worth, here is my letter to the DOJ regarding the
West-Thomson merger:
      
     Atty. Craig W. Conrath
     Chief, Merger Task Force
     U.S.D.O.J., Antitrust Division
     1401 H. Street, Suite 4000 N.W.
     Washinton, D.C.
     Via Fax: 202-307-5802
     
     
     
     
     Dear Mr. Conrath:
     
     
     I am a retired lawyer. I write this letter in regard to the proposed
Thomson
     - West merger solely on my own behalf as a consumer and citizen.
     
     I do not think the merger agreement should be approved. The
     Department's conditions are insufficient to protect competition.
     
     My objections are these:
     
     1. Failure to create viable competition.
     
     Legal publishing has a synergy when a publisher produces law for
multiple
     jurisdictions. Publishers attempt to address the market by creating
     "systems" that are consistent and easy to use for consumers, and
allow the
     same methods to be used to find law from a variety of sources. In
additio
     there are substantial economies of scale in the editing and
production
     processes.
     
     The consent decree envisions selling some of the products of Lawyer's
     Cooperative, but not the "system", and not the key products, AmJur
and
     ALR that allow the creation of a system. The result is a series of
isolated
     products that will not compete effectively with West's system and are
of
     questionable viability in the marketplace.
     
     
     
     2. Ineffective remedies for citations
     
     The proposed license agreement has a price for use of West's
citations that
     would foreclose its use by any small or new competitors. The only
     competitor who could afford the flat pricing would be a large one.
But the
     merger eliminates the only large competitor who does not already
license
     West's system. In effect, nothing is accomplished.
     
     Though the prohibition against challenging the validity of West's
dubious
     copyright claims are frequently found in licensing agreements, it
traduces
     the purpose of the merger conditions and is inconsistent with the
     Department's stated position on copyright of citations.
     
     
     3. Ineffective remedies for markets that become monopolies.
     
     Wisconsin currently has two competitive official reporters of
Wisconsin
     case law, West and Lawyer's Cooperative. After the merger it will
have
     one-- there will be no competition. The consent decree's remedy is to
allow
     the Wisconsin Supreme Court to renegotiate its contract. Since West
will
     be the only serious publisher available in the market why would
     renegotiating the contract do anything? A cynic might comment that it
     would give West an earlier opportunity to exercise its monopoly
power.
     
     Indeed, the situation in Wisconsin is somewhat more acute. Lawyer;'s
     Cooperative has taken the position that its cites are public domain
as is the
     text of the decisions. West takes a contrary opinion. So with the
loss of
     Lawyer's Cooperative, we lose access to public domain law in
Wisconsin
     for small peripheral publishers.
     
     
     
     Finally, I must point out that West is a well known "politically
connected"
     company. Its CEO was a key early supporter of Pres. Clinton's first
     campaign in Minnesota and recently Treasurer for Sen. Feinstein's
re-election campaign. West has made many contributions to political
     campaigns.
     
     The Department certainly should not treat differently a politically
connected
     company -- West has an absolute right to participate in politics.
However,
     in such a case it is important that the Department explain fully and
     adequately its reasoning so that the Department's decisions can be
     understood to be free of political taint. This the Department has
not done
     in this case. It fails to reveal or address the degree of
concentration left
     after its proposed conditions. It fails to reveal its reasoning or
motives for
     the conditions, It fails to reveal the course of negotiations.
     
     On the face of it, this is a merger between major competitors in a
highly
     concentrated industry. In appearance it is not a merger that should
be
     approved. Failure to adequately address why the Department is
approving
     it , and why the conditions adequately protect competition leaves the
     Department open to criticism.
     
     
     Yours Sincerely,
     /s/
     John Lederer
     
     



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